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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Article VIII, §5 of the Constitution of
Utah, and §78-2a-3(f), Utah Code Annotated, (1988, as amended).

CASE HISTORY
This is an appeal taken from the final order of denial
of appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea to the charge of
Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony,
and the subsequent judgment and commitment of the appellant to
the Utah State Prison for not less than 1 nor more than 15 years
by the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by Information dated November 9,
1988, with two (2) counts of Distribution of a Controlled
Substance, to wit:

Cocaine, in violation of §58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii),

Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), both Second Degree
Felonies, and Habitual Criminal, in violation of §76-8-1001, Utah
Code Annotated (1953, as amended), a First Degree Felony (R.710).
The Information alleged that the appellant sold drugs
to a confidential informant, working with the FBI and State
Narcotics Officers, on two (2) separate occasions in December,
1987, and further that the appellant was an habitual criminal

having been twice convicted and sentenced on qualifying felonies.
(R.7-10). At the time the appellant was charged with this
Information, he was in custody in the Salt Lake County Jail
awaiting trial on federal weapons violation charge.

The

appellant has remained in federal custody at all times pertinent
to this appeal.

(TR 12-18-89 p.6, lines 8-23).

On January 6,

1989, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges
in the Information. (R.17; TR 12-18-89 p.7, lines 5-7). On or
about June 21, 1989, appellant's counsel filed a Notice of Intent
to rely on the Defense of Entrapment (R.61) and noticed up an
evidentiary hearing on that issue on August 16, 1989. (R.68).

At

that time, appellant appeared, with his court appointed counsel,
before the Honorable Frank G. Noel for the taking of evidence on
the issue of entrapment, as provided for by statute.

(R.77-78).

During the course of the evidentiary hearing, appellant's counsel
was ordered to withdraw as counsel for the appellant because
appellee intended to call appellant's defense counsel as a
witness in the entrapment evidentiary hearing.
12-18-89 p.7, line 23; p.8, line 7).
taking of additional testimony.

(R.78, 80-82; TR

The Court suspended the

Once new counsel was appointed

to represent appellant, the evidentiary hearing on the entrapment
defense was re-scheduled for October 10, 1989, (R.86) but was
continued to October 30, 1989; and continued again for hearing on
October 31, 1989.

(TR 10-31-89).

Witnesses had been subpoenaed

for all three (3) scheduled hearings by defendant.

(R.88-91). On

October 31, 1989, appellant appeared before the Honorable Frank

G. Noel on the final scheduling of the entrapment evidentiary
hearing.

(TR 10-31-89).

Instead of proceeding to present

evidence of his defense, the Court was advised by appellant's
counsel that appellant wished to enter a plea of guilty to one
(1) count of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, to wit:
Cocaine, a
Second Degree Felony.

(TR 10-31-89, p.l).

The State

acknowledged that it would dismiss the second count of
Distribution of a Controlled Substance and the Habitual Criminal
charge upon appellant's plea described above.

(TR 10-31-89,

p.l).
Appellant's counsel had completed a Statement of
Defendant (see Addendum I, TR 10-31-89 p.l, line 22) for use in
the taking of the plea, which contained, among other things, a
summary of appellant's Constitutional rights; a statement of the
nature and the elements of the offense to which appellant would
plead; a summary of the facts appellant admitted which supported
the charge; and a statement of the plea bargain.

(R.92-98). The

appellant acknowledged that he had read the affidavit and his
attorney had read it to him.

(TR 10-31-89 p.l, lines 22-25).

The appellant acknowledged that he understood his constitutional
rights including right to jury trial, right to confront the
witnesses, right to present evidence, right to testify, privilege
against self-incrimination, and right to appeal.

(TR 10-31-89

p.2, line 3; p.4, line 5). The Judge then instructed appellant
to sign the Affidavit.

(TR 10-31-89 p.3, line 9) After some
3

other discussion the Court advised the appellant of the maximum
sentence which could be imposed.

(TR 10-31-89 p.3, lines 23-25;

p.4, line 12). Next, the Court reviewed the elements of the
offense along with the factual basis.

(TR 10-31-89 p.4, lines

13-25; p.5, line 6). After this colliquy, the appellant entered
his guilty plea.

(TR 10-31-89 p.5, lines 10-16).

After entry of the plea, the Court made some additional
inquiries regarding appellant's understanding of the plea bargain
(TR 10-31-89 p.5, line 17; p.6, line 15) and whether defendant
was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
lines 10-12).

(TR 10-31-89 p.6,

After further clarification of the plea bargain

the Court then found that the plea was "fully and voluntarily"
made.

(TR 10-31-89 p.7, line 2). The Court then said, "...if

you intend to ask this court to allow you to withdraw this guilty
plea, that request must be made within 30 days.
understand that?"

Do you

To which the appellant answered, yes.

(TR 10-

31-89, p.7, lines 4-12).
After the Court inquired regarding sentencing,
appellant's counsel advised the Court that the appellant wanted
to make a statement to the Court regarding the confidential
informant's conduct which had induced the appellant to provide
drugs to the confidential informant.

Appellant's counsel advised

the Court that appellant was drug dependent and that the
confidential informant working under the supervision of the
federal and state narcotics enforcement agencies, and knowing of
appellant's weakness for druges had introduced the appellant and
4

his wife to heroin on numerous occasions over a period of time
before the appellant supplied drugs to the confidential
informant.

Because the confidential informant had supplied him

with drugs on many occasions/ appellant then supplied the
confidential informant with drugs on two (2) occasions out of a
sense of obligation. (TR 10-31-89 p.8, line 4; p.9, line 9; see
Addendum III).

After this statement by counsel/ the Court did

not question appellant regarding his allegations of inducement.
(TR 12-18-89 p.20/ line 4).
Several hours after appellant pled guilty, appellant
wrote his counsel/ advising her that he wished to withdraw his
plea of guilty.

(TR 12-18-89 p.20f lines 5-22). Pursuant to

appellant's request/ on November 17/ 1989/ counsel filed a Motion
to Set Aside appellant's plea of guilty, (R.101-102) which was
heard before the Honorable Frank G. Noel on December 18/ 1989.
(R.105; TR 12-18-87) .
At that hearing, appellant testified that on the day he
entered his pleaf he was confused/ depressed/ and downhearted.
(TR 12-18-89 p.19/ line 10f line 13; p.lOr line 11; p.19/ line
13).

He had been in isolation/ in the "Hole/" in the County Jail

for two (2) weeks preceding the plea.

(TR 10-18-89 p.9/ lines

10-21). He had been unable to assist his counsel in locating
witnesses who were difficult to find to subpoena and/ without
telephone privileges, was not able to persuade these reluctant
witnesses to testify. (TR 12-18-89 p.9r line 25; p.l4r lines 311; p.15, lines 2-4). He was unable to contact his attorney to
5

thoroughly discuss his concerns.

(TR 12-18-89 p.15, lines 5-13).

For these reasons, appellant argued that his plea was not
voluntary.
Further, appellant testified that although his counsel
had advised him otherwise, he believed he had an entrapment
defense.

(TR 12-18-89 p.10, lines 18-22). He said that the

confidential informant "used my wife, possibly and myself. And
he used drugs to get to us and do things that we were trying to
stay away from doing."

Three (3) to four (4) weeks before

appellant sold drugs to the confidential informant, the
confidential informant had given appellant and his wife heroin
and/or cocaine four (4) to five (5) times per week.

Appellant

testified that he believed that the confidential informant's
activities were "illegal" and "wrong."

(TR 12-18-89 p.29, lines

21-24).
After the taking of appellant's testimony, and hearing
the argument of counsel on the other issues based on the motion,
the Court denied appellant's motion to withdraw his plea and
rescheduled sentencing for January 5, 1990.

(R.112)

On January

5, 1990, Judge Noel sentenced the appellant to the Utah State
Prison for an indeterminate term of not less than one (1) nor
more than fifteen (15) years to run concurrently with the
appellant's federal sentence.

(R.113).

On January 12, 1990, the

Judgment and Commitment issued from the Third District Court.
(R.113).

Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal and Designation of

Record on January 16, 1990. (R.114-115).
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's plea of guilty to the crime of
Distribution of a Controlled Substance was not knowingly,
intelligently, or voluntarily given.

The lower Court failed to

make appropriate findings as required by §77-35-11 (e), Utah Code
Annotated (1989, as amended), and improperly used the preGibbons standard review.

The lower Court failed to make an

adequate, factual inquiry into the voluntariness of appellant's
plea in light of his mental and emotional condition.

The lower

Court failed to advise the appellant of his right to crossexamine the witnesses against him as required by §77-35-11(e) (3),
Utah Code Annotated, (1989, as amended).

The lower Court failed

to establish on the record that the appellant understood the
nature and elements of the crime to which he pled in relation to
his claimed defense of entrapment.

The lower Court failed to

adequately advise the appellant that he may not be permitted to
withdraw his plea at a later date, even though his motion were
timely filed.

Therefore, the lower Court, in light of these

errors in the taking of the plea, abused its discretion in
denying appellant's motion to withdraw his previously entered
plea of guilty.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
JUDGE NOEL ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
HIS PLEA OF GUILTY TO DISTRIBUTION OF
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
Absent a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of
7

constitutional and statutory rights and strict compliance with
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant's
plea must be set aside.
It is well established that a knowing, intelligent and
voluntary plea of guilty that admits each element of the offense
has the same effect and weight as if the defendant had been found
guilty at trial by a jury of his peers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 231 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), State v.
Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah, 1987).

Since the entry of a

guilty plea is accomplished without a review of all the evidence
as would be had in trial and because it involves a waiver of
substantial constitutional rights, the Court has been granted
statutory authority to review the facts surrounding the entry of
a guilty plea and, if appropriate, can, upon a showing of good
cause, permit defendant to withdraw his previously entered guilty
plea.
§77-13-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended) providess
A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn prior to
conviction. A plea of guilty or no contest
may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown
and with leave of the Court. (Emphasis
added.)
Withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege and not a
right.
State v. Hansen, 627 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah, 1981).

The granting of a

motion to withdraw is within the sound discretion of the trial
court.

State v. Bennett, 657 P.2d 1353 (Utah, 1983).
8

If the

record does not demonstrate that a plea of guilty was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made, and the Court refuses to set
the plea aside, then it has been held that the Court has abused
its discretion.
App., 1987),

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah

State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App., 1989).

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
§75-35-11(3), Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as amended), sets forth

legislative criteria designed to insure that guilty pleas have
been knowingly and intelligently entered.

It provides:

(e)
The court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty or no contest and shall not accept
such a plea until the court has made the
findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly waived
his right to counsel and does not desire
counsel;
(2)
That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3)
That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory self-incrimination,
to a jury trial and to confront and crossexamine in open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea he waives
all of those rights;
(4)
That the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which he
is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements;
(5)
That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon
him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences; and,
(6)
Whether the tendered plea is a result
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement
and if so, what agreement had been reached.
(Emphasis added.)
Though our Rule 11 is patterned after the provisions of

9

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the specific
requirements are slightly different.

Our Rule requires the Court

to make the aforesaid findings without specifying the manner in
which the Judge must establish the factual basis for his
findings; whereas under the Federal Rule, the trial court is
statutorily required to "address the defendant personally" to
determine if the defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary and to
determine if there is a factual basis for the plea which would
show an adequate relationship between defendant's admitted acts
and the requirements of the law.

Despite this procedural

difference, the rules are similar in that they both require the
Court accepting the plea to make factual findings that the
defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving
his constitutional rights and is indeed guilty of the crime to
which he is pleading.
Failure to strictly adhere to the federal procedure can
result in reversal as in McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 22
L.Ed.2d 418, 89 S.Ct. 1166 (1969).

There the Court reversed the

conviction of a defendant based upon his plea of guilty because
the trial judge had failed to strictly comply with the
requirements of the federal Rule designed to insure that the plea
was knowing and voluntary.

The Court further ordered that all

factors used in assessing the voluntariness of the plea must be
made a matter of record to aid an Appellate Court in its review.
Since the record was silent on the waiver of the defendant's
constitutional rights, defendant was permitted to withdraw his
10

plea of guilty.
Later in Boykin v. Alabama, supra, the Supreme Court
used similar reasoning as in McCarthy, supra, to hold that it was
plain reversible error for a state trial judge to accept a guilty
plea without "an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and
voluntary" at 242. The Court, at 243, firmly stated:
What is at stake for an accused facing death
or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude
of which Courts are capable in canvassing the
matter with the accused to make sure that he
has a full understanding of what the plea
connotes and of its consequence. When the
Judge discharges that function, he leaves a
record adequate for any review that may be
later sought...
(Citation omitted).
Before a guilty plea can be accepted, the trial court
must first afford the defendant all rights founded on McCarthy
and Boykin, supra, as well as our Rule 11, and determine, as a
matter of fact, based upon the record, that the defendant
received "meaningful notice of the true nature of the charges
against him, the first and most universally recognized
requirement of due process."

Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637,

645, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257, 49 L.Ed.2d 198 (1976).

The defendant

must further "understand the elements of the crimes charged and
the relationship of the law to the facts."

State v. Gibbons,

supra at 1312, citing with approval McCarthy, supra.

"There is

no adequate substitute for demonstrating on the record at the
time the plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the
nature of the charge against him."
1172.

(Emphasis added).

McCarthy, at 470, 89 S.Ct. at

The trial judge cannot rely upon
11

defense counsel's assertion that the defendant fully understands
the nature of the charge and the elements of the offense.
McCarthy, supra.

See also, State v. Gibbons, supra.

To assist in the process of accepting guilty pleas,
some Utah courts have designed a pre-printed form to advise a
defendant of his constitutional rights, to explain the nature and
the elements of the offense, andto detail the complete plea
bargain.

Such a pre-printed form was used in the instant case.

(See Addendum I.)
A trial judge is permitted to use a pre-printed
affidavit as a "starting point, not an end point, in the pleading
process."

Gibbons at 1313. However,

...A sufficient affidavit is one which is
signed by the defendant, his attorney, the
rosecutor, and the trial judge and which lists
the names and the degrees of the crimes
charged. The affidavit should contain both a
statement of the elements of the offenses and
a synopsis of the defendant's acts that
establish the elements of the crimes charged.
The affidavit should clearly state the
allowable punishment of the crimes charged and
should note that multiple punishments for
multiple crimes may be imposed consecutively.
The affidavit should list individually and
specifically the rights waived by the entry of
the guilty plea. The details of any plea
bargain would be set forth in the affidavit as
well as a disclaimer concerning any sentencing
recommendations as required by Rule 11(e).
Finally, the affidavit should disclose the
defendant's ability to read and understand the
English language, the absence of promises to
induce the plea, and the defendant's
competency. The trial judge should then
review the statements in the affidavit with
the defendant, question the defendant
concerning his understanding of it, and
12

fulfill the other requirements imposed by §7735-11 on the record before accepting the
guilty plea,
(Emphasis added.) Gibbons at p.
1313.
Before the procedure was mandated by Gibbons, technical
non-compliance with Rule 11 had been excused in Warner v. Morris,
709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310
(Utah, 1985).

In these cases the Supreme Court held that so long

as the "record as a whole" established that the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea, the guilty plea would
stand.
With Gibbons, the "record as a whole" test was replaced
with "strict compliance."
invalidates the plea.

Technical non-compliance with Rule 11

State v. Vasilacopulos, supra.

Close examination of the record in the instant case
reveals that:

A)

the court failed to make the appropriate

finding required by Rule 11(e) of Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure; B) the lower court failed to make an adequate, factual
inquiry into the voluntariness of appellant's plea in light of
his mental and emotional condition; C)

the lower court failed to

inform the appellant that he had the right to cross-examine, in
open court, the witnesses against him; D) the lower court failed
to make a factual inquiry into the appellant's understanding of
the nature and the elements of the offense in
light of appellant's affirmative defense of entrapment; and, E)
the lower court failed to advise the appellant that a motion to
withdraw guilty plea was in the discretion of the court, leaving
13

the appellant with a false impression that he would be permitted
to set aside his plea upon the filing of an appropriate motion.
POINT TWO
THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS AS REQUIRED BY
RULE 11(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
IN ADVANCE OF ACCEPTING APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
cited above, requires the lower court to make specific findings,
among others, that a guilty plea is voluntarily made; that the
defendant knows and understands his constitutional rights, and
that he waives those rights by entering a plea of guilty; that
the defendant understands the nature and element of the offense
and that by pleading guilty, the defendant admits the commission
of the offense.
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial Courts the
burden of ensuring that Constitutional and
Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when
a guilty plea is entered. Gibbons at 1312.
The only finding made by the lower Court after
accepting appellant's plea was that the plea was "fully and
voluntarily" made.
"Strict and not just substantial compliance with the
rule is required."

State v. Valencia, supra at 1334.

Vasilocopulos, supra.

State v.

Because the trial court failed in its duty

to make the appropriate findings at the time the plea was
entered, appellant's plea was not properly entered and must be
set aside.

14

POINT THREE
THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL
INQUIRY INTO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF APPELLANT'S
PLEA IN LIGHT OF HIS MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL
CONDITION
At the time the lower court took appellant's pleaf the
court failed to ask the appellant whether he was suffering from
any mental disease or defect which would impair his ability to
enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.

The court did inquire

of appellant whether he was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol (Tr. 10-31-89 p.6, lines 10 - 12), and whether he was
entering his plea voluntarily without force or promises (Tr. 1031-89 p.5, lines 17 - 21).
Two weeks before the hearing before Judge Noel, the
appellant was placed in an isolation cell in the Salt Lake County
jail.

While in isolation appellant was unable to assist in his

own defense, was unable to assist counsel in locating defense
witnesses, was unable to telephone reluctant witnesses to
persuade them to come forward and was unable to communicate with
his counsel.

Appellant testified that at the time he entered his

plea he was confused, downhearted, and depressed.

Therefore, his

plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT FAILED TO ADVISE THE APPELLANT THAT
HE HAD THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE, IN OPEN COURT,
THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
Although the lower Court reviewed with appellant many
of the constitutional rights required by Rule 11(e)(3), it failed
to advise the appellant that he had a right to cross-examine the
15

witnesses against him in open court.
The right of cross-examination is a valuable and
fundamental right guaranteed by Article I, §12 of the Utah
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

The right is generally considered to derive from

an accused's right to confront the witnesses against him, but it
also gives the right of confrontation real meaning in that:
Cross-examination is the principal means by
which the believability of a witness and the
truth of his testimony is tested... We have
recognized that the exposure to a witness'
motivation in testifying is a proper and
important function of the constitutionally
protected right of cross-examination. Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39
L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)
The right of cross-examination is especially important
in cases which involve "informers or others who hope for police
leniency."

State v. Maestes, 564 P.2d 1386, 1388, citing with

approval, Evans v. Alaska, 550 P.2d 830 (Alaska, 1976).

In the

instant case, the critical witness against appellant was such an
informer described in Evans v. Alaska (TR 12-18-89 p.12, lines 17).

The failure to advise appellant of his right to cross-

examine the witnesses against him not only violated Rule 11, but
also rendered appellant's plea involuntary.
POINT FIVE
THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE A FACTUAL INQUIRY OF
THE APPELLANT'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE AND THE
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IN LIGHT OF THE APPELLANT'S
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT
§76-2-303(1) Utah Code Annotated
provides:
16

(1953, as amended)

It is a defense that the actor was entrapped
into committing the offense. Entrapment
occurs when a law enforcement officer or a
person directed by or acting in cooperation
with the officer induces the commission of an
offense in order to obtain evidence of the
commission for prosecution by methods creating
a substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit
it. Conduct merely affording a person an
opportunity to commit an offense does not
constitute entrapment
With this defense, a defendant may deny criminal liability while
admitting to the commission of the offense itself.

Such was the

instant case. Appellant did not deny that he had intentionally
sold drugs to the confidential informant.

Appellant claimed,

however, that he was entrapped into committing the offense. The
confidential informant had given the appellant and his wife
heroin and/or cocaine four (4) to five (5) times per week in the
three (3) to four (4) weeks preceding.

Appellant alleged that

this improper conduct induced the commission of the crimes to
which appellant stood charged.

(TR 12-18-89 p.11, line 23; p.14,

line 11); p.29, line 21; p.30, line 4).
At the time the Court accepted the appellant's plea of
guilty to the crime of distribution of a controlled substance, it
was aware that the appellant had raised the affirmative defense
of entrapment.

In fact, the Court had already taken some limited

testimony on the defense and had continued the remaining
testimony three (3) times. When the case was called, the Judge
said, "The matter before the Court this morning is State of Utah
v. Douglas Reed Jones, C [sic] 88-1656.
17

This matter is set this

morning for a hearing on an entrapment motion."
p.l, lines 1-5)

"...Do I understand correctly that a resolution

in this matter has been reached?"
13).

(TR 10/31/89

(TR 10/31/89, p.l, lines 12-

The Court then proceeded with the taking of the plea during

which the following colloquy took place (TR 10/31/89, p.4, line
13 through p. 5, line 6):
THE COURT:
THE ELEMENTS OF THIS OFFENSE WITH
WHICH YOU'VE BEEN CHARGED ARE THAT YOU
INTENTIONALLY DISTRIBUTED A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, TO WIT, COCAINE. IN ORDER FOR YOU
TO BE CONVICTED OF THIS OFFENSE, THE STATE
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVE EACH AND EVERYONE
OF THOSE ELEMENTS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?
THE DEFENDANT:

YES.

THE COURT:
HOWEVER, IF YOU PLEAD GUILTY
TODAY THE STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO MAKE
THAT PROOF, YOU'LL BE CONVICTED OF THAT CHARGE
BY YOUR OWN ADMISSION; DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?
THE DEFENDANT:

YES.

THE COURT:
THEY ALLEGE AS FACTS TO SUPPORT
THIS CHARGE ON DECEMBER 11, 1987, YOU SOLD ONE
QUARTER OUNCE OF COCAINE TO AN UNDERCOVER
NARCOTICS AGENT FOR $425.00, IN SALT LAKE
CITY, UTAH. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT IF YOU
PLEAD GUILTY, YOU'LL BE ADMITTING THOSE FACTS?
THE DEFENDANT:

YES, SIR.

No inquiry was made by the Court regarding the entrapment defense
prior to acceptance of the guilty plea.

Later, when the Court

raised the issue of a pre-sentence report, appellant's counsel
advised the Court (TR 10/31/89, p.8, line 4 through p.9, line 9):
MS. MOWER:
...WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE INCLUDED
FOR THE COURT'S CONSIDERATION, THOUGH, A
STATEMENT BY MR JONES. AND THE THRUST OF THE
STATEMENT WOULD BE THIS: MR. JONES DOES NOT
DENY THAT THERE WAS A TRANSFER OF A CONTROLLED
18

SUBSTANCE. BUT HIS CONCERN FROM THE VERY
BEGINNING OF THE CASE WAS THE CONDUCT OF THE
INFORMANT IN THIS CASE.
MR. JONES WOULD NOT HAVE YOU BELIEVE
THAT HE IS AS HE SAYS, AN ANGLE (sic). HE
CERTAINLY HAD A PROBLEM WITH DRUGS BEFORE HE
EVER MET MR. FERNANDEZ, BEFORE HE DID ANYTHING
WITH MR. FERNANDEZ. BUT HE FEELS AS THOUGH
MR. FERNANDEZ PREYED ON HIS DRUG VULNERABILITY
AND DID THAT BY WAY OF COMING TO MR. JONES'S
HOUSE PRIOR TO THE TIME OF TRANSACTIONS,
INTRODUCING MR. JONES TO REGULARS OF HEROIN,
AND THEN GOT MR. JONES TO SELL HIM SOME
COCAINE OUT OF AN OBLIGATION BECAUSE THE
UNDERCOVER INFORMANT HAD PROVIDED HIM WITH
DRUGS.
MR. JONES HAS BEEN VERY CONCERNED
ABOUT THAT, AND THAT'S THE ISSUE THAT HE ASKED
ME TO RAISE IN TERMS OF THE ENTRAPMENT
DEFENSE. HE BELIEVED THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY
VULNERABLE, AND HE DIDN'T BELIEVE THAT'S
SOMETHING THAT UNDERCOVER AGENTS OUGHT TO BE
DOING, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF VULNERABILITIES OF
DRUG ADDICTS.
HE'S WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE IN TERMS
OF A DEFENSE, WE WOULD PROBABLY — WE WOULD
NOT BE SUCCESSFUL, BUT HE WANTS THE COURT TO
UNDERSTAND PART OF THE MOTIVATION BEHIND THIS
WAS THE FACT THAT MR. FERNANDEZ HAD BEEN
COMING TO HIS HOUSE GIVING HIM DRUGS, SHOT HIM
UP, AND HIS WIFE AS WELL.
THE DEFENDANT:

WHILE I WAS AT WORK.

MS. MOWER:
HIS CONCERN IS THAT
PROBABLY SHOULDN'T BE HAPPENING IN THESE KINDS
OF CASES.
Even after this exchange, the Court made no effort to question
the appellant about counsel's allegations of alleged inducement.
In State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah, 1983),
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Concerns for the legitimacy or truth of a
guilty plea is an integral part of
ascertaining the voluntariness of that plea.
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(2)
requires the court to find that a guilty plea
is voluntarily made before it accepts it. A
guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is
uninformed. Breckenridge at 443,
To determine whether or not a defendant is property informed, the
Utah Supreme Court has provided the following guidance:
We think the most effective way to do this is
to have a defendant state in his own words his
understanding of the offense and the actions
which make him guilty of the offense. By this
statement, the trial court can assure itself
that the defendant is truly submitting a
voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the
record on appeal will clearly reflect the
defendant's understanding. State v. Copeland,
765 P.2d 1266, at 1273 (Utah, 1988)
What appears to be mere dicta in Copeland was
transformed to law in State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App.
1989).

In that case, the defendant claimed that he did not enter

a knowing and voluntary guilty plea to a drug charge even though
the court used a pre-printed affidavit which presumably contained
some of the information required by Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

Instead, the Court of Appeals found:

The brief, conclusory inquiry posed by the
trial judge is by itself inadequate to assure
the Court that defendant's plea was entered
with the informed knowledge and understanding
required by Rule 11 (s) (sic). When an
affidavit is used to evidence defendant's
knowledge and willingness to plead guilty, the
trial court's examination of defendant
regarding the affidavit's contents should be
sufficiently detailed and extensive to provide
a factual basis to conclude from defendant's
responses that his decision was knowing and
voluntary. This understanding of the elements
of the charges and the relationship of the law
and the facts may not be presumed from a
silent, or incomplete, examination. Valencia
at 1335 (Emphasis added.)
20

Because the lower Court never did inquire of
appellant's understanding of the law and the facts in relation to
his defense of entrapment, the Court could not properly conclude
that appellant's plea was voluntary.
POINT SIX
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO ADVISE THE APPELLANT THAT A
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA WAS IN THE DISCRETION
OF THE COURT LEAVING APPELLANT WITH A FALSE IMPRESSION
THAT HE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO SET ASIDE HIS PLEA UPON
THE FILING OF AN APPROPRIATE MOTION
During the hearing on appellant's Motion to Set Aside
Guilty Plea, appellant testified that he believed, on the basis
of his counsel's statements and those of the Court, that he could
elect to withdraw his plea of guilty if he so chose.

Appellant

testified that when he was reviewing the Change of Plea Statement
with counsel, prior to his plea, his counsel advised him that he
could withdraw his plea within thirty (30) days.

(TR 12/18/89,

p.10, lines 18-24; p.17, line 9-11; p.21, line 14-15.)

This

belief that the plea could be withdrawn was confirmed during the
taking of appellant's plea when the following took place in
appellant's presence:
MS. MOWER:
LET ME REMIND THE COURT WE MUST
ADVISE MR. JONES ABOUT HIS RIGHT TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA. IT IS GOOD FOR ONLY 30 DAYS.
THE COURT:
CERTAINLY, I INTEND TO DO THAT.
(TR 10/31/89, p.3, line 10-13.)
Later, after the Court had accepted the appellant's plea of
guilty, the Court said:
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THE COURT: AND I WILL ADVISE YOU MR. JONES
THAT IF YOU INTEND TO ASK THIS COURT TO ALLOW
YOU TO WITHDRAW THIS GUILTY PLEA THAT REQUEST
MUST BE MADE WITHIN 3 0 DAYS; DO YOU UNDERSTAND
THAT?
THE DEFENDANT: YES.
(TR 10/31/89, p.7, line 4-8.)
These three (3) references to "30 days" to withdraw a
guilty plea result from counsel's and the Court's misguided
attempt to satisfy the additional language added to §77-13-6,
Utah Code Annotated/ in 1989, as follows:
(2) (b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest is made by motion, and shall be
made within 30 days after the entry of the
plea.
and Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
that the court must make a finding that:
(7) the defendant has been advised of the
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw
a plea of guilty or not contest.
At no time did counsel or the Court advise the
appellant of the requirements of §77-13-6 (2) (a) which provides:
"A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good
cause shown and with leave of the court."
Nor did the Court correct counsel's apparent
misstatement regarding the appellant's "right to withdraw his
plea."

This failure to correct and clarify the correct standard

prescribed by law misinformed the appellant and understandingly
gave rise to his confusion.
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CONCLUSION
Under the strict compliance requirement of Gibbons,
appellant's plea must be set aside.

Technical non-compliance

with Rule 11 has rendered appellant's guilty plea involuntary.
Appellant therefore seeks an Order of this court vacating his
guilty plea and remanding the matter to the Third Judicial
District Court for trial.

«

Respectfully submitted this ^ - ^ ^ ^ a y of June, 1990.
"

tON & HOLLAND
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ADDENDUM # 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

Tjiith

JUD^I^L v; D,JSTRlG^

STATE OF UTAH

OCT 3 1 1989
fia.wT w*iftt CCv • "<

THE STATE OF UTAH,

ey

LrtV-*; v<«tfK

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

Plaintiff/
v.

Criminal No,
Defendant•

COMES NOW, T)0|y^4<> fjFFJ) ^ X J f c S the defendant in this
case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea off (guiltyr rao congestt) to the
following crimec^:
CRIME

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT (Min/Max)

B..

C.

D.

I

have

received

a copy of the (cVadae^

•information)

against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature
elements of the offenseOsV for which I am pleading^ (guiltyj) & o
corrcest).

The elements of the crimeCw of which I am charged are as
f o l l o w s : ())

Ite&KTWTVfrl

P ) ~£/SnQfti/77<J70>
3) c^-k d6KfrUu^f\ Stus&r^KsOZ
</) CdOlMt^
My conduct/ and the conduct of other persons for which I
am criminally

liable, that constitutes

the

elements

of the

c r i m e ^ charged are as follows:

1

^
I am entering

bttesK plea()£
this/thft^SBv
plea()(X voluntarily

and with

knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me.
2.

IM[have notJ> (pa^^) waived my right to counsel.

If I

have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly,
intelligently

and

voluntarily

because

of

the

following

reasons:

3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read

this statement and understand the nature and elements of the
charges,

my

rights

in

this

and

consequences of my plea of guilty.

other

proceedings

and

the

4.

If I have not waived my right to counsel/ my attorney
_, and I have had an opportunity to

discuss this statement/ my rights and the consequences of my
guilty plea with my attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury,

6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the

right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to
have them cross-examined by my attorney.

I also know that I

have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense
to testify in court upon my behalf.
7.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own

behalf but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to
testify

or

give

evidence

against

myself

and

no

adverse

inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against

me I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set
for trial/ at which time the State of Utah will have the burden
of proving
doubt.

each element

of

the

charge

beyond

a

reasonable

If the trial is before a jury the verdict must be

unanimous•
9.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would
have the right to appeal ray conviction and sentence to the Utah
Court of Appeals or# where allowed/ to the Supreme Court of
Utah and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such
appeal, those costs would be paid by the state.
10.

I know that the maximum possible sentence may be

imposed upon my plea of guilty, and that sentence may be for a

- 3 -

prison term, fine, or both.
fine,

a^£2_%

surcharge,

63-63-9, will be imposed.

I know that in addition to any
required by Utah Code Annotated

I also know that I may be ordered by

the court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my
crimes.
11.

I know

that

imprisonment

may be for consecutive

periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to
more than one charge.

I also know that if I am on probation,

parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I
have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea
in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed upon me.
.12.

I know and understand that by pleading /fguiltx)) J$o

coni^st) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights
set out

in the preceding

paragraphs.

I also know

that

by

entering such plea^X) I am admitting and do so admit that I
have committed

the conduct, alleged

and

I am guilty

of the

crimeyk) for which my pleaQy LsZ^jfe entered.
13 .
result

My plea(& of /guilty))^patfdoWest) ^ ) i j / n ^ the

of a plea bargain^T&S^ween myself and the prosecuting

attorney.
bargain,

The promises, duties and provisions of this plea
if any,

are fully contained in the Plea Agreement

attached to this affidavit.
14.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction

of

the

charges

for

sentencing

either defense counsel or the prosecuting
binding

on

the judge.

I also know that

- 4 -

made or sought by
attorney

are not

any opinions they

express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also
not binding on the court.
15.

No threats/ coercion/ or unlawful influence of any

kind have been made to induce me to plead
promises except/

guilty,

and no

those contained herein and in the attached

plea agreement/ have been made to me.
16.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to

me by my attorney/ and I understand its provisions.

I know

that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this
affidavit.

I do not wish to make any changes because all of

the statements are correct.
17.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my

attorney.
18.
through

y \

I am

years of age; I have attended school

the

ade and I can read and understand the

English language.
medication

or

I was not under the influence of any drugs/

intoxicants

plea(V> was made.

when

the

decision

to

enter

the

I am not presently under the influence of

any drugs, medication or intoxicants.
19.

I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning

mind/ mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease/ defect
or

impairment

that

would

prevent

me

voluntarily entering my plea<
p:
intelligently andI voli\ntarily
DATED this £t^*^ dav of

• rgrvw v ,
efendant/
- 5 -

from

knowingly/

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for
the

defendant

above,

statement

or

that

discussed

it

with

and

that

I have

I know

read

him/hVr

it

and

he/sWe

to

him/het

and

that

he/slW

believe

understands the meaning of its contents and
physically competent.
after

an

has read the
I have
fully

is mentally and

To the best of my knowledge and belief

appropriate

investigation,

the

elements

of

the

crimeCsi) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made lay the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurateT"knd Jcriie.

:ne]
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
the case against
reviewed

, defendant.

this statement

declarations,

including

of the defendant
the elements

I have

and find that the

of the offense of the

charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct.

No

improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea
have been offered defendant.

The plea negotiations are fully

contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement
or

as

supplemented

on

record

before

the court.

There is

reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction

of

defendant

for

the

- 6 -

offense(s)

for

which

the

plea(s)

is/are

entered

and

acceptance of the plea(s) would

serve the public interest.

"Prosecuting/Ajbtorne^
ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement
and

certification/

the court

finds the defendants

plea of

guilty is freely and voluntarily made and £t is so ordered that
the defendants plea oi

(i^cchrcest) to the chargeCsQ

set forth in the statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

3\

day of £)^X , 192 /

s~\
DISTRICT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM #2

77-35-11. Rule 11 — Pleas [Repealed effective July 1, 1990).
(1) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a
defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the
defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant may not be required to plead until he has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(2) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no
contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and
mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a
defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(3) A defendant may plead no contest only with the
consent of the court.
(4) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty,
the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant
unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall
advise the defendant, or his counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty
or no contest, and may not accept the plea until the
court has found:
(a) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he has knowingly waived his right to counsel
and does not desire counsel;
(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial,
and to confront and cross-examine in open court
the witnesses against him, and that by entering
the plea he waives all of those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the ofTense to which he is entering
the plea; that upon trial the prosecution would
have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the
plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon
him for each offense to which a plea is entered,
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(0 if the tendered plea is a result of a Jbrior
plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so,
what agreement has been reached; and
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty or no contest.
(6) Failure to advise the defendant of the time
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty or no contest is not a ground for setting the
plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the
time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6.

77-13-6. Withdrawn! of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any
time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with
leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest is made by motion, and shall be made
within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an
imprisoned person under Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

1989

76-2-303. Entrapment.
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a
law enforcement officer or a person directed by or
acting in co-operation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence
of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable
when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is
based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to
a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor denies commission of the
conduct charged to constitute the offense.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court
shall hear evidence on the issue and shall determine
as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant
was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit a
later filing.
(6) Should the court determine that the defendant
was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the
defendant to the jury at trial. Any order by the court
dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be appealable by the state.
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the
defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the
defendant shall not be admitted except that in a trial
where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his
past convictions for felonies and any testimony given
by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment may be
used to impeach his testimony at trial.
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ADDENDUM #3

4

WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE INCLUDED FOR THE COURT'S

5

CONSIDERATION, THOUGH, A STATEMENT BY MR. JONES.

6

THRUST OF THE STATEMENT WOULD BE THIS:

7

DENY THAT THERE WAS A TRANSFER OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.

8

BUT HIS CONCERN FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THIS CASE WAS

9

THE CONDUCT OF THE INFORMANT IN THIS CASE.

10

AND THE

MR. JONES DOES NOT

MR. JONES WOULD NOT HAVE YOU BELIEVE THAT HE IS

11

AS HE SAYS, AN ANGLE.

12

DRUGS BEFORE HE EVER MET MR. FERNANDEZ, BEFORE HE DID

13

ANYTHING WITH MR. FERNANDEZ.

14

FERNANDEZ PREYED ON HIS DRUG VULNERABILITY AND DID THAT BY

15

WAY OF COMING TO MR. JONES'S HOUSE PRIOR TO THE TIME OF

16

TRANSACTIONS, INTRODUCING MR. JONES TO REGULARS OF HEROIN,

17

AND THEN GOT MR. JONES TO SELL HIM SOME COCAINE OUT OF AN

18

OBLIGATION BECAUSE THE UNDERCOVER INFORMANT HAD PROVIDED

19

HIM WITH DRUGS.

20

HE CERTAINLY HAD A PROBLEM WITH

BUT HE FEELS AS THOUGH MR.

MR. JONES HAS BEEN VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THAT,

21

AND THAT'S THE ISSUE THAT HE ASKED ME TO RAISE IN TERMS OF

22

THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE.

23

PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE, AND HE DIDN'T BELIEVE THAT'S

24

SOMETHING THAT UNDERCOVER AGENTS OUGHT TO BE DOING, TAKING

25

ADVANTAGE OF VULNERABILITIES OF DRUG ADDICTS.

HE BELIEVED THAT HE WAS
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HE'S WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE IN TERMS OF A

2

DEFENSE, WE WOULD PROBABLY —

3

BUT HE WANTS THE COURT TO UNDERSTAND PART OF THE MOTIVATION

4

BEHIND THIS WAS THE FACT THAT MR. FERNANDEZ HAD BEEN COMING

5

TO HIS HOUSE GIVING HIM DRUGS, SHOT HIM UP, AND HIS WIFE AS

6

WELL.

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

MS. MOWER:

9

WE WOULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL,

WHILE I WAS AT WORK.

HIS CONCERN IS THAT PROBABLY

SHOULDN'T BE HAPPENING IN THESE KINDS OF CASES.

